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Abstract
Lindle~ (1957)

demonstrated that from a Bayesian standpoint a given

level of statistical significance P, carries less evidence against
the null hypothesis Ho the larger (more powerful) the test.
Moreover, if the sample is sufficiently large, a result significant
at 5% or lower may represent strong evidence in support of Ho '
o
not against it. Contrary to Lindley's argument, a great many applied

on H

researchers, trained exclusively in orthodox statistics, feel
intuitively that to "reject" the null hypothesis Ho at (say) a=5% is
more convincing evidence, ceteris paribus, against Ho the larger the
sample.

This is a consistent finding of surveys in empirical

psychology.

Similarly, in accounting, see Burgstahler (1987).

In econometrics, "Lindley's paradox"

(as it has become known

statistics) has been explained in well known books by Zellner (1971),
Leamer (1978) and Judge et ai.

(1982), but is not widely appreciated.

The objective of this paper is to reiterate the Bayesian argument in
an applied context familiar to empirical researchers in accounting.

*Graduate School of Management and Public Policy
University of Sydney
2006, Australia
November, 1989

1. Introduction
Surveys in psychology, including most recently Nelson et al.

(1986),

suggest that the great majority of researchers who use statistical
tests of significance believe intuitively that the null hypothesis is
discredited more convincingly by a larger sample (more powerful test)
at the same level of significance.

In accounting, the evidential

interpretation of tests is not often discussed, not at least in
published research.

But in a methodological paper written for

research students, Burgstahler takes apparently the same position as
those researchers surveyed in psychology:

For more powerful tests, there is a lower degree of belief
in the null (and greater belief in the alternative) as a
result of observation of a significant statistic.
(Burgstahler, 1987, p.207)

Burgstahler claims that a "significant" result represents stronger
evidence the higher the power of the test. l

Consistent with this

conclusion, the suggestion by some researchers (Burgstahler gives
references) that a given level of significance entails greater
evidence against the null hypothesis when the sample is small
(power is low) than when the sample is very large (power is high)
is expressly denied:

... researchers may even mistakenly assert that a
significant result from a low-power test is more convincing
evidence against the null than a significant result from a
high-power test because a more extreme test statistic is
required to attain significance for a low-power test.
(Burgstahler, 1987, p.207)

Notwithstanding Burgstahler's anathema, it has been noted among
theoretical statisticians at least since Lindley (1957) that under
fairly general conditions the posterior probability of the null
hypothesis, given a fixed level of significance P, increases (for a
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given prior) with the sample size n.

Thus, a "significant" result

is more compelling if the sample size is small than large.
known as "Lindley's (or Jeffreys') paradox".

This is

References include

Jeffreys (1939, pp.359-360), Lindley (1957, pp.187-189), Pratt (1961,
pp.165-166; 1976, p.782; 1977, pp.63-67), Edwards et al.

(1963,

pp.221-231), Zellner (1971, pp.303-306; 1984, pp.276-279),
Rosenkrantz (1973, p.314; 1977, p.208), Cox and Hinkley (1974,
pp.395-397), Basu (1975, pp.43-47), Leamer (1978, pp.104-105),
Good (1980, pp.307-309; 1981, pp.163-164; 1982, p.342; 1983,
pp.312-314; 1984, pp.300-302; 1985, p.260), Hill (1982, p.345),
Judge et al.

(1982, p.101), Berger (1985, p.156), DeGroot (1986,

pp.449-450), Royall (1986, pp.313-345), Johnstone (1986, pp.493-494;
1989a, p.5; 1989c), and Berger and Sellke (1987, p.112).

The

passages quoted below are clear and authoritative:

Prior beliefs about the null hypothesis aside, bare
significance at the 5% level does not contradict the null
hypothesis equally as the statistical problem varies or as
the sample size varies in a given problem (for instance,
testing p=.5 against p=.6 with 10 or 1000 binomial
observations). Consider also a most powerful level 5% test
for a simple hypothesis against a simple alternative having
power 99%: if the distributions are continuous, a result
which is just significant can hardly be said to favor the
alternative, since it is also just significant at level 1%
when the hypotheses are reversed.
In fact, the more
powerful the test, the more a just significant result
favors the null hypothesis.
(Pratt, 1961, pp.165-166)

... the interpretation to be placed on the phrase
"significant at 5%" depends on the sample size: it is
more indicative of the falsity of the null hypothesis with
a small sample than with a large one.
(Lindley and Scott,
1984, p.3) .

.. . as the sample size increases in testing precise
hypotheses, a given P value provides less and less real
evidence against the null.
(Berger and Sellke, 1987,
p .136)
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2. An Example
Dodd et al.

(1984) examine the security returns of firms with

qualified financial reports.

Abnormal returns are measured over

3 and 5 day periods around the day qualification is made known.
The authors model the return process as:

x - Binomial (n,8)

where x is the number of firms observed with negative abnormal
returns, n is the total number of firms observed (the sample size),
and 8 is the probability with which firms with qualified financial
reports yield negative abnormal returns.

The hypothesis tested,

H : 8=.5, is that 50% of firms with qualified reports earn negative
o
abnormal returns around the time of qualification.

No alternative

hypothesis is specified, but the test used is one-(right)-tailed.
Thus, the alternative implied is HA: 8>.5.2

Two subcategories of

firms, those with qualifications attributed to (i)

litigation and

(ii) asset realizing,3 exhibit statistically significant

(at a=5%)

proportions of negative abnormal returns over the 3 day observation
interval.

The results of these two tests are as follows:

Test (i)

litigation firms

n

130

x

76
.0325

p-level

Test (ii) asset realizing firms

n
x

p-level

Both p-levels are about 3%.

=

93

56
.0307

On a classical inferential (Fisherian)

interpretation, the strength of evidence against Ho : 8=.5 is the
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same for both tests. 4

By comparison, on a Bayesian (probabilistic)

interpretation, the evidence against Ho is stronger for the smaller
(less powerful) test than for the test with the larger sample size.
That is, there is greater evidence that 9 exceeds 50% for asset
realizing firms than for litigation firms.

The mathematical basis

for this inference is that the likelihood ratio, Pr{x\Ho}/Pr{x\Ha},
is lower for test (ii) than test (i) over the range of all point
alternatives H a : S=9a, where Sa>.58.

In the interval

.5<9a~.58,

the likelihood ratios of test results (i) and (ii) are approximately
equal, but as Sa increases, the ratio for the result in test (ii)
becomes much lower than that for the result in test (i).5

Therefore,

unless the prior probability of HA: 9>.5 is nearly all lumped in the
range .5 < Sa

~

.58, the posterior probability of Ho is less for test

(ii) than test (i).6
in the range .5< 9 a

~

For prior distributions on HA not concentrated
.58, the posterior probability of the null

hypothesis H o is (much) lower on test (ii), the test with the smaller
sample size, than for the larger test.

That is, Ho is discredited

more by the smaller (less powerful) test than by the test with the
larger sample.

Test (i), which is the larger (more powerful) test, discredits Ho
more strongly than test (ii) only i f the mass of prior probability on
HA is concentrated in the interval .5 < Sa

~

.58. 7

Hence, a reader who

interprets the result in test (i) as stronger evidence against Ho
than test (ii) assumes implicitly a prior distribution in this
class. S

Specifically, an inference (belief) based on the results of

tests (i) and (ii) that Ho is less probable for litigation firms than
asset realizing firms implies (if one accepts Bayes' theorem) the
prior belief that if H o : 9=.5 is not true then S is almost certainly
in the interval .5 < Sa

~

.58.9
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For more diffuse prior distributions, even those with a relatively
high probability on 9 in the range .5< 9 a ~ .58, test (ii) provides
the stronger evidence.

For example, assume the prior probability

distribution Pr{Ho}=Pr{HA}=.5, where Pr{HA} is distributed on
H

o : 9>.5 according to

g(9) oc: 9 2(1-9)4.10

This distribution gives both

Ho and HA prior probability .5,11 which is necessary if the competing
hypotheses Ho and HA are to be evaluated "objectively"
(impartially) .12

The prior density on 9>.5, g(9), represented

by Figure 1 below, is proportional to a beta distribution with
parameters a=3 and b=5 (note that the distribution shown has not been
normalized).

These parameter values are chosen such that g(9) is

maximum in the range (.5,1] at 9=.5 and tails off toward zero as 9
approaches one.

[Figure 1 about here]

The posterior probability of Ho ' Pr{Holx}, based on the prior
probability distribution described above, is given as follows:

r

Pr{Holx}

1

(.5)n

f

9 2 (1-9)4 c:ie

.5

where B

.••.• (1)
1

J

9 x +2 (1-9) n-x+4 c:ie

.5
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is the weighted likelihood ratio or "Bayes' factor" in favor of the
null hypothesis H

o against the alternative HA.

Note that for the

purpose of revising probability assessments using Bayes' theorem,
the likelihood ratio is an exhaustive summary of the information
contained in the sample concerning the unknown parameter.

From equation (1), the posterior probability of Ho ' Pr{Holx}, is
.2379 for test (i) and .2130 for test (ii) .13

Thus, assuming the

prior density function g(8) proportional to 8 2(1-8)4, the null
hypothesis is discredited more strongly by test (ii) than test (i).
There is not much difference between the two results, but if the
prior on H is distributed more evenly toward larger values of 8,
A
the difference between the Bayesian results on tests (i) and (ii)
becomes greater.

For example, if the prior probability on HA,

Pr{H
is distributed uniformly, i.e., if the density function
A}=.5,
g(8)

is constant on (.5,1], the posterior probability of Ho '

Pr{Holx), is given by:

Pr{Holx}

••••• (2)

where B
1

2

f

8 x (1-8) n-x d8

.5

which equals .4236 for test (i) and .3652 for test (ii).

Note that for priors over HA concentrated on values of 8 around .7
or higher, the posterior probability of Ho is lower on test (ii) than
test (i), but neither posterior is small.

For example, if the prior
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distribution gives simple hypotheses Ho: 9=.5 and Ha: 9=9a, where
9

a=.7(.75)

[.77], each probability .5 (other hypotheses are excluded

a priori), the probability of the hypothesis Ho is .88(.999) [.9999]
on test (i), and .51(.95) [.99] on the result in test (ii).

This is

a simple example of Lindley's paradox, whereby results which are
"statistically significant" in orthodox terms entail evidence
in favor of the null hypothesis, not against it.

Lindley's paradox is apparent in both tests (i) and (ii) for prior
distributions on HA concentrated around 9~.7.

For distributions

with more weight in the interval .5<9< .7, inconsistency between
the orthodox and Bayesian inferences appears at larger sample sizes
than those in the Dodd et ai. study.

If the sample size n is very

large, the conventional and Bayesian inferences based on a
"significant" result, {x: P-level=a}, where a=5% say, are generally
not consistent.

For example, in a hypothesis test of Ho : 9=.5

against HA: 9>.5, given the prior probability distribution presumed
in equation (2) above, the result x=527(1037) in n=1000(2000) trials
has (one-sided) P-level equal to .05, but gives Bayesian posterior
probability Pr{Holx}=.7546(.8269).

Lindley (1957, p.190) notes that

for more moderate sample sizes, such as those in tests (i) and (ii)
compared in this paper, the conventional and Bayesian conclusions
may often be consistent (although not often the same; the Bayesian
inference is expressed as a probability on Ho or on an interval
around the null value of 9, whereas the orthodox inference is
typically something less precise, such as a statement of the form
"the null hypothesis is probably false", or "there is strong evidence
against the null hypothesis").

Care should be taken, however, when

the sample size is very large.

See Johnstone (1989c) on the

interpretation of large sample tests.
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3. Other Dodd et al. Results
In this section, the Dodd et al. results of binomial tests for
the entire sample (n=283) over 3 and 5 day observation intervals
are examined.

The Bayesian inferences based on these results are

considered in relation to the orthodox P-values reported by the
authors.

For comparison of the Bayesian and orthodox results based

on various other Dodd et al. observations, see Appendix A.

Table 1 below is taken from the Dodd et al. paper (Table 6, p.24)
but with the addition of Bayesian posterior probabilities
corresponding to the P-levels stated.

These probabilities are based,

for convenience, on the prior distribution Pr{Hoj=Pr{HAj=.5, where
Pr{HAI is distributed uniformly on
above.

.5<e~1,

as per equation (2)

The sensitivity of the Bayesian results to the priors on

which these are calculated is discussed in footnotes below.

Table 1
Excerpt from Dodd et al. Table 6

All firms

Event window

n

-1 to +1

-2 to +2

'it of firms

283

283

x

'it < 0

165

153

P

%

< 0

58

54

=

P-value (binomial test) "

.0031

.0954

Bayesian Pr{Holxjb

.1194

.7435

"Uo: 9 = .5 against 11A: 9> .5.
bBascd on the prior density function g(9) constant over (.5, 11.
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(a)

The -1 to +1 Result.

are consistent.

Here the orthodox and Bayesian inferences

The orthodox inference based on a P-level of .0031

is that there is strong evidence against the hypothesis tested;
either the hypothesis Ho is false or an event of very low probability

(p-level) has occurred, hence it may be inferred that Ho is probably
false or in some sense strongly discredited (this is classical
Fisherian logic).

Consistent with the orthodox result, the Bayesian

posterior probability of the null hypothesis is only .1194 (down from
a prior of .5) .14

It is apparent, therefore, that if the P-level

observed is low enough (i.e., if the test statistic observed is
discrepant enough with Ho ) ' it does not matter that the sample is
moderately large, the posterior probability of Ho is low nonetheless.
Generally, an extremely low P-value represents strong evidence
against H

o

even if the sample is fairly large.

Ultimately, however,

Lindley's paradox takes over; if n is sufficiently large, even the
smallest P-values support Ho .

Noue, for example, the results

conditioned on P-levels .001 and .0001 tabled in Appendix B below.

(b)

The -2 to +2 Result.

If the sample size is large, a result just

significant at say a=.05 or a=.OI may support the null hypothesis.
For results "not significant" at these conventional partitions
(i.e., P-levels > .05), the sample size need not be very large before
H

o

is

(strongly) supported. 1S

In the case of the Dodd et al. result

for days -2 to +2, a P-level of .0954 with a sample of n=283
increases the probability of Ho from .5 to .7435. 16

In this case,

the Bayesian and conventional inferences are logically inconsistent.
A conventional interpretation of the P-level .0966 is that there is
neither (strong) evidence for or against Ho '

which would suggest,

contrary to the Bayesian inference, that the probability of Ho is
not (much) changed.
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Note that if the P-level observed had been higher, and or the
sample size larger, the Bayesian posterior probability of Ho would
have increased more substantially.

Suppose, for example, that the

sample size had been n=500(1000) [5000].

In this case, assuming the

same P-level .0954, the probability of H o ' given by equation (2),
would have increased from .5 to .7999(.8521) [.9305].

It is clearly

important, therefore, to interpret orthodox P-values very carefully.
In particular, the sample size must be accounted for in conjunction
with the P-level reported.

This is explained in just a few orthodox

textbooks; notably, Cox and Hinkley (1974, pp. 397-398), and Kendall
and Stuart (1979, p.197).

See also Hodges and Lehmann (1954), and

Appendix B of this paper.

(c)

Excluding the "Busy" Period.

The classical interpretation of

statistical significance tests (due to R. A. Fisher) makes no
reference to the sample size (see footnote 4).

It is not usual,

therefore, that researchers condition the inferential interpretation
of observed levels of significance on the size of the sample
observed.

Consider, for example, the paragraph below from the paper

by Dodd et al.:

The number of observations in the full sample falls from
283 to 210 when the 'busy' period [data for firms filing
around March 30] is eliminated . . . The proportion of firms
with negative abnormal returns in the period -1 to +1
increases from 58% to 61% .. which decreases the P value for
the binomial test from 0.0031 to 0.0006. The proportion of
negative returns in the asset realizing group in the same
window rises to 67% from 60%, and the P value for the
binomial test decreases from 0.0307 to 0.0049. Other
P values are essentially unaltered.
(p.28l

In this passage, the authors report changes in P-levels, but give no
relevance to the corresponding changes in sample size.

A lower

11

p-Ievel is interesting in itself, but more so in conjunction with a
smaller sample.

In particular:

(i) the decrease in the P-level for all firms

(-1 to +1) from .0031

to .0006 when the "busy" period is excluded strengthens the evidence
against Ho : 9=.5; not only is the P-Ievel smaller but so is the
sample size. I?

The probability of Ho given by equation (2) falls

from .1194 (n=283, P-Ievel=.0031) to .0230 (n=210, P-level=.0006).
Similarly, Pr{Holx}, calculated as per equation (1), falls from
.0536 to .0118.

(ii) the decrease in the P-level for asset realizing firms

(-1 to +1)

cannot be interpreted immediately because the reduced sample size is
not reported.

It would appear, however, that the new sample size is

n=66; a result x=44 in n=66 observations gives p=67% and P-level
.0049 which is as reported by the authors.

If n=66 is the size of

the reduced sample, the probability of Ho : 9=.5, given a uniform
prior on HA, falls from .3652 (n=93, P-level=.0307) to .0766

(n=66, P-level =.0049).

For the prior assumed in equation (1),

the posterior probability of Ho falls from .2130 to .0561.
(iii) if firms filing around March 30 can be excluded from the
sample, there is generally an increase in the evidence against
the null hypothesis H o : 9=.5.

It is reported that most P-values are

no lower than when the "busy" observations are included, however the
sample sizes are lower.

Generally, therefore, so is the Bayesian

posterior probability, Pr{Holx}.

4. Conclusion
The result in a test of statistical significance should be
interpreted with respect to the sample size.
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5% in to-day's small sample does not mean the same as 5% in
to-morrows large one.
(Lindley, 1957, p.189)

In general, a fixed level of significance P represents less evidence
against the null hypothesis as the sample size n increases. IS
Moreover, if n is large, a result which is significant at 5% or lower
may often represent evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, not
against it.

To account for this logical "paradox", it is recommended

in advanced orthodox textbooks (references are provided above) that
the "critical" level of significance ex be made more stringent
(smaller) than usual when the sample size is large.

If ex is made

(very) small when n is (very) large, then presumably the null
hypothesis Ho will not be "rejected" when the evidence, on a Bayesian
interpretation, is that Ho is (approximately) true. I9

Thus, by

setting ex lower than normal when n is large, an orthodox
statistician can corne to conclusions not inconsistent with those of a
Bayesian.

There is, however, no theoretical basis on which to fix ex with
respect to n.

In a decision theory approach, the test characteristic

ex (defined as the probability of a type I error) is determined by
reference to the loss function, but if the test is to be interpreted

inferentially (e.g., "on the basis of the sample observed, the
null hypothesis Ho is highly improbable")

rather than as a decision

between alternate courses of action (e.g., accept or reject the
account balance stated by the company audited) there is no particular
decision contemplated and hence no loss function to which to refer.
It is not clear, therefore, without explicit Bayesian calculations,
how to interpret a given level of significance in terms of evidence.
The sample size is important, but there is no formal relationship by
which P-levels can be calibrated Bayesianly [Berger and Delampady
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(1987) pp.327-328; Berger and Sellke (1987) pp.13S-136, 138].
This is of great concern to those researchers who employ orthodox
techniques, particularly tests of significance, yet think of
themselves, at least in principle, as Bayesian; cf., Burgstahler
(1987, p.204).

An orthodox P-level is a summary of data, but not in itself an
(inductive) inference.

Inference is what one makes of that P-level.

The logical inference based on a reported P-level depends generally
on whether the logic applied is orthodox (Fisherian) or Bayesian.
Recently, statistical theorists have compared the Bayesian and
conventional interpretations of orthodox P-levels over a broad class
of statistical tests.

Note especially the papers of Berger and

Sellke (1987), Berger and Delampady (1987), and Casella and Berger
(1987)

(not the same Berger) in recent issues of the journals of the

American Statistical Association (JASA and Statistical Science) .
In accounting, the paper by Burgstahler (1987) published in the
Accounting Review takes ostensibly a Bayesian approach but comes
erroneously to "orthodox" (contra-Bayesian) conclusions (note again
footnote 1).

Researchers who accept Burgstahler's argument may be

under the impression that to be orthodox is in effect, or ideally, to
be Bayesian.

It is important, therefore, that empirical researchers

in accounting, who may not have been trained in Bayesian statistics,
appreciate that the Bayesian and conventional inferences predicated
on the same P-level are not necessarily, or in general, the same,
especially if the sample size is very large.

In particular, Bayesian theorists maintain that the larger the
sample size, the weaker, generally, the evidence (against the null
hypothesis) entailed by a given level of significance.

This is of

14

particular concern in relation to securities market based research in
accounting and finance where some samples are immensely large [Ball
and Foster (1982) pp.186-187].

In studies such as these, results

only just significant at levels such as 5% may more support the null
hypothesis than discredit it.

It may be useful, therefore, as in

this paper, to re-examine previously published results using Bayesian
instead of orthodox techniques.

A great many published conclusions

will be strongly confirmed (strengthened), particularly if the
observed P-level is very low or the sample size not very large.
However, more importantly perhaps, established results based on very
large samples where the p-level is not extremely low may in some
cases be qualitatively incompatible with Bayesian conclusions based
on the same experiment.

It is not logical (Bayesian) to argue that

merely because the observed level of significance is say 5% or less,
the null hypothesis is (necessarily) discredited.

If the objective

of an empirical research study is to discredit the null hypothesis

(i.e., to demonstrate or confirm "an effect", such as information
content), a result just significant at 5%, when the sample size is
very large, is usually not significant in any sense but the formal
statistical.

Moreover, on a more Bayesian analysis, the hypothesis

tested may be strongly supported.

In orthodox terms, a very large test means that the null hypothesis
is almost certain to be "rejected" at say a=5% even if the true
parameter is very close to e (assuming that the model is correct

i.e., power Pr{P-level::;a I ea)~l for ea~eo.

W);

It is no surprise,

therefore, and not of great significance in itself, if, in a very
large experiment, the observed level of significance is say .05;

cf., Berkson (1938, pp.526-527) and Hodges and Lehmann (1954, p.261).
Moreover, if the sample size is sufficiently large, the orthodox

15

(two-sided) 100(1-a)% confidence interval corresponding to the
result (two-sided P-Ievel:a, n) is [9 0

,

90 +£] , where 9 0 i s the null

(hypothesized) value of the unknown paramater 9, and £ (which may be
negative) is arbitrarily small.

Moreover, if the sample size is very

large, a result significant at say a:.05 (eg., a P-Ievel of say .04)
may imply a confidence interval not including 9 0

,

but so close to 9 0

and so short that if the true parameter 9 is included in that
interval, the null hypothesis, Ho : 9:90, is as good as correct for
any practical purpose.

In a case such as this, it is more to the point to report the
100(1-a)% confidence interval (for a:.05 say) implied by the P-Ievel
observed than the P-Ievel by itself.

Generally, if the sample size

is very large, a report which says that the observed P-Ievel is equal
to .049, or, ~ore ambiguously, that the particular sample observed is
significant at a:.05, entails logically strong evidence of little or
no real effect, but may not be interpreted as such by readers who
routinely reject the (usually null) hypothesis of nil effect, or
consider that hypothesis discredited, on seeing the locution
"significant at a:.05".
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Appendix A

Table 2 below is a modification of the Dodd et al. Table 6 (p.24).
For n greater than 19,

The P-values shown are from the original table.

these are calculated using the normal approximation of the binomial
Note that for n=36, the

distribution (with continuity correction).

proportions of firms with negative abnormal returns given in the original
table do not match the stated P-levels.

The matching proportions are

.56=20/36 (-1 to +1) and .53=19/20 (-2 to +2).

Similarly, for n=19 the

proportions of firms with negative returns implied by the P-levels stated
are .63=12/19 (-1 to +1) and .58=11/19 (-2 to +2).

In addition to these

alterations, Table 2 includes the Bayesian posterior probability of Ho'
Pr(Holxl, calculated both from equations (1) and (2).

Table 2
Dodd et al. Table 6 Reconstructed

Type of Qualification

Window

n

x

p=x/n

P-level"

All

-1 to +1

283

165

.58

.0031

.1194

.0536

-2 to +2

283

153

.54

.0954

.7435

.4961

-1 to +1

130

76

.58

.0325

.4236

.2379

-2 to +2

130

72

.55

.1271

.7085

.4739

-1 to +1

93

56

.60

.0307

.3652

.2130

-2 to +2

93

50

.53

.2670

.7962

.5850

-1 to +1

36

20

.56

.3089

.7255

.5282

-2 to +2

36

19

.53

.4340

.7864

.5924

-1 to +1

19

12

.63

.1796

.5253

.3980

-2 to +2

19

10

.53

.3238

.7498

.5684

-1 to +1

16

5

.31

.9616

.8876

.7350

-2 to +2

16

8

.50

.5982

.7695

.5910

-1 to +1
-2 to +2

5
5

3
3

.60
.60

.5000
.5000

.5882
.5882

.4912
.4912

PrlHo I x}

b

Litigation

Asset Realizing

Multiple Uncertainties

Future Financing

Going Concern

Disclaimers

"Binomiallcst of llo: 9 = .5 against HA: 9 > .5.
bBased on the prior density function g(9) constant over (.5. 1].
cBased on the prior density function g(9) oc 92(1-9)4 over (.5, IJ.

C
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Note that the low posterior probability of the null hypothesis (-1 to +1)
for the whole sample (for both priors) is attributable to firms in the
litigation and asset realizing categories.

For firms in the other

categories, and for all firms over the wider observation interval,
pr{Holx} is (for both priors) generally higher than Pr{Ho}=.5, indicating
that the Dodd et al. binomial tests tend to confirm the null hypothesis
that positive and negative abnormal returns are equally likely for firms
with qualified audit reports.
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Appendix B

Classical levels of significance should be interpreted in relation
to the size of the sample.

The importance of the sample size can be

demonstrated from a Bayesian perspective by comparing the posterior
probability of the hypothesis tested, Pr{Holx}, conditioned on a fixed
level of significance (P-level), over increasing values of the sample
size n.

Consider, for example, a

(one-sided) test of significance on

the null hypothesis Ho : 9=9 0=.5 against HA: 9>90, given the model

x

Binomial (n,9), where n is the sample size, 9 is the probability of

a "success" (9 is assumed constant from trial to trial), and x is the
observed number of "successes" (x
test described by Dodd et al.

~

n).

This is the one-sided binomial

Table 3 below shows the number and

proportion of successes necessary to achieve given levels of significance
. OS,

.10, and .25 for increasing values of n ,

Table 3
Observed Proportion p Such That Level of Significance Equals P

P-level=.05

n

x&

20
30
100
250
1000
2000
10000
100000
1000000
10000000
50000000

14
20
59
139
527
1037
5083
50261
500823
5002601
25005816

p=x/ nb
.7000
.6667
.5900
.5560
.5270
.5185
.5083
.5026
.5008
.5003
.5001

P-level= .10

x

p=x/n
13

19
57
136
521
1029
5065
50203
500641
5002027
25004532

.6500
.6300
.5700
.5440
.5210
.5145
.5065
.5020
.5006
.5002
.5001

P-level=.25

x

p=x/n

12
17
54
131
511
1016
5034
50107
500338
5001067
25002385

.6000
.5667
.5400
.5240
.5110
.5080
.5034
.5011
.5003
.5001
.5000

"The values of x given are those with P-levels closest to the stated levels. For n=20, the exact P-levels are .0577, .1316 and .2517.
For larger n, the exact P-levels arc very close to the levels stated,
bRounded to four decimal places.

Note that as the sample size n increases, the proportion of successes

p=x/n with P-level equal to a approaches 9 0=.5 (the higher a the closer
{p:

P-level=a} to 9 0),

Intuitively, therefore, or in terms of the

likelihood ratio, Pr{xIHo}/Pr{x\Ha}, the higher n the wider the interval
of alternative hypotheses 9E [9 a, 1], where 9 a>9 0, excluded or strongly
refuted by a result just significant at a; cf., Good (1981, p.164).
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Hence, depending on the prior distribution, the more the Bayesian
posterior distribution converges on Ho : 8=80

For example, assume the

,

"objective" (impartial) prior probability distribution Pr{Ho}=Pr{HA}=.5,
where Pr{HA } is distributed according to g(8) uniformly over (.5,1].
Table 4 below gives the posterior probability of Ho' Pr{Holx), given
results with P-levels equal to .00001,

.0001,

.001,

.01,

.05,

.10,

.25,

and .40 for increasing values of the sample size n.

Table 4
Bayesian Pr{Ho I x}"
P-level

n

20
30
100
250
1000
2000
10000
100000
1000000
10000000
50000000

.00001

.0001

.001

.0000
.0000
.0002
.0006
.0012
.0018
.0042
.0137
.0427
.1239
.2405

.0002
.0004
.0026
.0045
.0117
.0151
.0379
.1090
.2829
.5555
.7365

.0113
.0085
.0226
.0377
.0938
.1172
.2464
.5140
.7702
.9141
.9597

.01

.05

.10

.25

.40

.0464
.0783
.1855
.2622
.4521
.5205
.7228
.8946
.9641
.9884
.9948

.2877
.3102
.4540
.5791
.7546
.8269
.9136
.9714
.9909
.9971
.9987

.4616
.4601
.6231
.7242
.8521
.8951
.9499
.9840
.9949
.9984
.9993

.6094
.6934
.7881
.8596
.9291
.9477
.9768
.9926
.9976
.9993
.9997

.7157
.7664
.8501
.9009
.9506
.9660
.9846
.9951
.9984
.9995
.9998

"Based on the prior density function g(9) constant over (.5, I).

Note that as the sample size increases, the posterior probability of Ho,
conditioned on {x: P-level=a} approaches 1 for fixed a.

Moreover, if n

is sufficiently large, a result just significant at .01,

.05,

.10 or any

other level of significance, no matter how small, supports the null
hypothesis.

Thus, even if x is significant at a=.Ol or lower, if the

sample size n is (very) large, the evidence supports the hypothesis
tested.

With regard to results "not significant" at conventional

partitions such as a=.05, if the observed level of significance is high,
the sample size n need not be very large before Ho is much more strongly
supported (more probable) than HA'

Thus, statistical insignificance

may often represent extremely strong evidence in favor of the null
hypothesis.

This has been explained by both orthodox and Bayesian

statistical theorists.

References include Berkson (1942, p.331) Neyman

(1955, pp.40-41), Gibbons and Pratt (1975, p.21), Birnbaum (1977,
pp.37-38), Pratt (1977, pp.64-65) and Johnstone (198ge).
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Footnotes

1.

The framework on which Burgstahler's conclusion is deduced
makes use of less than all available sample information.
Johnstone (1989a) and Johnstone and Lindley (1989) suggest
a more logical (Bayesian) framework.

2.

A priori, a qualified audit report may make negative abnormal
returns more probable but not less probable.

3.

These are the terms used by Dodd et al.

The "litigation"

category includes firms involved in lawsuits of sufficient
importance or potential consequence to warrant qualification
by the auditors.

The "asset realizing" group represents firms

which, the auditors judge, have assets reported at figures
above realizable value.
4.

Evidence is measured conventionally by reference only to the
level of significance (p-level) observed; there is no
requirement that the sample size be taken into account (other
than to calculate P).

Nor is it necessary to consider the

probability (or p-level) of the data on alternative hypotheses;

cf., Johnstone (1989b).

See Seidenfeld (1979, pp.70-102) and

Johnstone (1987a) for explanation of the classical (Fisherian)
logic for statistical inference.

5.

Hence, unless g(e) is concentrated in the interval (.5, .58],
the Bayes' factor in favor of

Ho

against HA:

B
1

J

ex (l-e) n-x g(e)

.5

de
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where g(e) represents the normalized prior density on
HA: 9>.5, is greater for test (i) than test (ii).
6.

For the purpose of comparing the relative force of the two
tests, it is assumed that the prior probability distribution is
the same for each test.

7.

Note that if the sample sizes of the tests compared had been
larger, the prior density on HA: 9>.5 would have to be
concentrated in an even shorter interval (i.e.,
need to be more perverse).

g(e) would

For example, if the test sizes were

n1=1130 and n2=1093 (adding 1000 to each), then, given the same

P-levels as those actually observed, test (i) yields the lower
posterior only if the density on 8>.5 is almost all in the
interval (.5, .527].

8.

If we accept Bayes' theorem we are almost bound to use it.
Inferences made other than in accord with Bayes' theorem

(e.g., the usual Fisherian inference, based on a low p-level,
that the null hypothesis is discredited and probably false) are
likely to imply, working backwards, an unacceptable prior
distribution.

A researcher who does not make explicit his

prior belief distribution cannot draw an inference from
empirical evidence without implying a prior probability
distribution of some class.

If priors of the class implied

are not acceptable, then neither is the reseacher's stated
inference, unless, of course, the laws of probability are
ignored.

9.

Thus no allowance is made for the possibility that 9 is closer
to .65 or .75 or higher.

To a Bayesian this is dogmatic - the
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Bayesian principle is to give very unlikely values of 9 very
small, but non-zero, prior probability.

Otherwise, if the data

strongly supports an improbable value of 9, the evidence will
not be reflected in the posterior probability distribution;
mathematically, a value of 9 given zero prior weight gets zero
posterior weight too, whatever the evidence.

10.

The function g represents the normalized prior density for 9
over 9>.5.

Thus, g can be interpreted as the probability

(density) of 9 given the condition that HA: 9>.5 is true.

11.

Berger and Sellke (1987, pp.114-115) explain the use of
priors with a "spike" of probability on 9 0.

Briefly, if the

hypothesis in question is not literally the point Ho : 9=80
but an interval hypothesis h o : 19-901~b, b is often small
enough (particularly if n is not extremely large) that Pr{holx}
is approximated very closely by Pr{Holx}.

Thus, the null

hypothesis, written Ho : 9=90, can be interpreted as an
interval (disjunction} of point hypotheses, on which it is
reasonable a priori to place non-zero probability.

12.

Note, however, that for the purpose of demonstrating that the
smaller test carries stronger evidence against Ho than the
larger test, it is not necessary that the competing hypotheses,

H

o

and HA' be given equal prior probability.

only that H

o

It is necessary

have the same prior weight in each test.

That is

the respective starting points must be the same.

13.

The incomplete beta function was computed using a power series
outlined by Kennedy and Gentle (1980, pp.104-107).

14.

This result is quite insensitive to the prior distribution
on HA: 9>.5.

Specifically, the posterior probability of Ho
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conditioned on the observed value of x is low unless values
of 9 more strongly indicated by the data (i.e., closer to the
observed sample proportion p=.58) are ruled highly improbable
a priori.

For example, if the prior probability on HA is

distributed uniformly on the interval .65S9S1 say,
Pr{Holx} equals:
1

(.5)283/ [(.5)283+ (1/.35) f9 1 64(1-9)119 d9]

.9514

.65

But if the prior is distributed more evenly over all HA: 9>.5,
the posterior probability of Ho is generally well below .5.
For the prior represented by Figure 1 above, Pr{ Holx}=.0536.
15.

It is often claimed that results which are not significant at
conventional levels such as a=5% should be interpreted not as
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis H o ' but merely as no
(strong) evidence against Ho; cf., Cox (1977, p.57; 1982,
p.325), and Johnstone (1988, pp.322-323).

This interpretation

is not always appropriate; if the sample size is (very) large,
middle and high P-values can entail extremely strong evidence
in favor of the null hypothesis.

16.

See Appendix B.

This increase in the probability of Ho holds over a wide class
of possible prior distributions.

The probability of Ho is

reduced only for prior distributions on HA with a large
concentration around 9=.54.

But if the prior on HA is

distributed more evenly, or concentrated around values of 9
greater than about .58, the P-level .0954 with n=283 represents
evidence supporting Ho .

Note that even for the prior density

function g(9) represented by Figure 1 in the text, which has
over half its weight in the interval (.5, .6], the posterior
probability of Ho decreases only marginally from .5 to .4961.
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17.

Data for firms filing 10-K reports with the SEC close to
March 30 are considered relatively unreliable due to the great
volume of reports processed by SEC personnel at about that
time.

18.

The relevance of the sample size is apparent from an orthodox
standpoint if results are expressed as confidence intervals
rather than P-levels.

In general, the results (p-level=a,n1)

and (p-level=a,n2), where n1*n2' give rise to different
confidence intervals at the same level of confidence (although
the interval with the larger n is fully subsumed within the
wider interval) .
19.

In most orthodox statistical textbooks, the result of a
statistical hypothesis or significance test is expressed as
either "accept H " or "reject Ho " at a fixed (predesignated)

o

"critical" level of significance.

This formal approach is due

to Neyman and Pearson, and is widely accepted.

For critical

accounts of the Neyman-Pearson paradigm, see Seidenfeld
(1979, pp.28-69) and Johnstone (1987b).
20.

An invalid or inadequate model may reduce the power of a test
[Lev and Ohlson (1982) p.270].

However, it is possible too

that the power of the test (the probability of rejecting the
null hypothesis conditional on a specified alternative) may
increase; cf., Johnstone (1989d).

For example, if a relevant

variable is excluded from a regression equation, the t-values
of variables included (and correlated with the variable
excluded) may be biased upward (or downward) towards the level
required for rejection of the null.
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Beta Prior 9(9): Parameters a=3, b=5
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